The Return of the Golden Crescent? Rising Poppy Cultivation across Southwest Asia

There are signs of increased levels of poppy planting in Afghanistan in 2026, especially in Badakhshan in northeast Afghanistan, where widespread cultivation has persisted despite the Taliban drugs ban. There are also changing patterns of poppy cultivation in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran where farmers from southwest Afghanistan are increasingly relocating to cultivate poppy in response to the Taliban’s efforts to restrict opium production. Of particular concern is the evidence of a further shift in both cultivation practices and scale, with large plots of drip-irrigated poppy in Sistan Balochistan province in Iran, and possibly across the border in Balochistan in Pakistan. In both areas farmers from southwest Afghanistan are playing a significant role in what is an unprecedented development in the region, and a further indicator of the limits of state power in the increasingly restive tri-border area between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.

Consequently, while many drug analysts and commentators focus on the risk synthetic opioids pose to consumers in Western Europe and consider widespread opium production in southwest Asia a thing of the past, evidence suggests a rapidly evolving situation in what used to be known as the “Golden Crescent”. One in which supplies of heroin to Europe are sustained because of substantial opium stocks in Afghanistan and the relocation of cultivation into Pakistan and Iran, as well as innovation in cultivation practices and processing, including improved conversions rates for opium to heroin, and widespread adulteration of opiates consumed in the region.

Rising Poppy Cultivation Across Southwest Asia

While opium prices have been on an upward trajectory during the planting season for the 2026 crop, reaching around $500 per kilogram in January 2026, they remain well below the December 2023 peak of $1,024 (see Figure 1 and 2). Consequently, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the spike in opium prices in late 2023 was a significant market overreaction as both farmers and traders in Afghanistan sought to hoard opium in anticipation of a second consecutive year of the poppy ban and what they believed would be an even more dramatic rise in prices in 2024.

Since then, the market has recalibrated, recognising the large volume of opium stocks in Afghanistan, continued harvests despite the poppy ban, and the emergence of substantial opium production in Pakistan, and Iran. This has put downward pressure on opium prices despite four consecutive years of historically low levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Improved opium to heroin conversion rates (and possibly greater purity), as well as increased adulteration of opiates in regional markets, has helped ensure a continued supply of heroin to premium markets in Europe.

Figure 1: Opium prices in Afghanistan remain at historically high levels but despite four consecutive years of low levels of cultivation are significantly lower than in December 2023 when they exceeded US$1,000 per kilogramme

Figure 2: While opium prices have risen in recent months, they are half that of late 2023 when farmers and traders hoarded their opium anticipating dramatic increases following the second consecutive year of the Taliban drug ban. Prices maintained a downward trajectory through 2024 and much of 2025, only rising in the latter half of the year

Moreover, early indications are of increased poppy planting in Afghanistan in 2026. While too early to confirm with imagery, at this stage in the growing season, this follows on from a steady growth in cultivation in both 2024 and 2025 (see Figure 3). In particular, farmers in the northeastern province of Badakhshan have planted large amounts of poppy on their rainfed lands in the fall, and many intend to plant more poppy in the spring. There are also signs of increased levels of poppy cultivation in the irrigated areas of the province, as farmers look to recover from the economic effects of the failure of last years’ crop caused by the drought.

In contrast, while farmers in northern Helmand openly report growing poppy for the first time in several years, there is no indication of the widespread cultivation that was typical in the province prior to 2022 and before the imposition of the poppy ban. The Taliban remain vigilant, and substantial opium stocks, which provide ample capital gains due to high prices in the southwest, continue to deter most landed farmers from planting poppy. In the eastern province of Nangarhar, once a major producer of opium, poppy cultivation remains negligible even in some of the most remote mountainous areas near the border with Pakistan. Border tensions and a significant Taliban presence in the area help maintain the ban despite the difficult terrain.

Figure 3: Poppy cultivation has continued despite the Taliban ban, with notable increases in the southwest and in Badakhshan in 2024 and 2025

Moreover, evidence suggests that in late 2025 an even greater number of farmers from southwest Afghanistan migrated to grow poppy in Pakistan and Iran than they did last poppy season. Most have gone to Balochistan in Pakistan and Sistan Balochistan in Iran, and there is growing evidence of widespread poppy cultivation in multiple areas. Although from early in the season, and therefore not conclusive, imagery analysis shows increased land under cultivation in the district of Loralai in Balochistan where poppy was concentrated in 2025. Afghan farmers in Sistan Balochistan also report increased poppy cultivation in Iran this year.

In both areas, poppy is typically farmed under a partnership between a Pakistani or Iranian landowner and an Afghan farmer, with costs and yields shared equally. If a farm is large - and many of them are - the Afghan partner will recruit farmers from Afghanistan’s southwestern provinces as sharecroppers in return for one sixth to one quarter of the final yield. Additional Afghan labour is then hired during the season as daily wage labourers to weed and harvest the opium. This all suggests that poppy cultivation in Pakistan and Iran, and the remittances it provides, is becoming an increasingly important part of rural livelihoods for farmers in southwest Afghanistan.

Furthermore, in parts of Iran, large fields of drip irrigated poppy have been established (see Figure 4). This is unprecedented in the region: it requires significant sunken costs - typically between $5,000 and $10,000 per hectare - and suggests that farmers have few fears of eradication. Photographs and videos show that the crop growth in these fields is well advanced, providing farmers with an earlier crop, higher yields, and potentially preferential market prices. Drip-irrigated poppy fields in Iran are sizeable, often more than two hectares, while some are significantly larger.

Imagery also shows similar patterns of advanced plant growth in Balochistan in Pakistan, but agronomic conditions and higher costs may mitigate the use of drip irrigation there (see Figure 5 and 6). From a purely economic perspective, drip-irrigated poppy is a rational move given the current price of opium, offering profits in the first year of around US$10,000 a hectare. There is a risk that once this practice is embedded it will become particularly difficult to tackle, particularly if security further deteriorates in the tri-border area.

Figure 4a: Drip irrigated poppy in Sistan Balochistan province, Iran

Figure 4b: There is a long history of drip irrigation in Sistan Balochistan and where it is used to grow poppy fields are particularly large

Figure 5: In parts of Balochistan there are possible signs of drip irrigated poppy with advanced and consistent growth in multiple fields in areas where poppy was grown extensively in 2025

Figure 6: High resolution imagery shows suspected poppy fields in Loralai in Balochistan where plant growth is much more advanced than in 2025, and may be drip irrigated

Economic Pressures are Driving Rising Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan and in the Region

While opium stocks remain critical to sustaining the poppy ban in southwest Afghanistan, there are increasing signs of economic distress amongst landed farmers as their inventory depletes and agricultural incomes decline. Under current cropping patterns in the southwest, a landed farmer with less than three hectares of surface-irrigated land, or four hectares of former desert land, will not earn enough income from his farm to meet their family’s basic needs (see Figure 7). Currently, they have few options other than to sell the opium they stored prior to the Taliban poppy ban, but they also recognise that if they do not cultivate again and replenish their stocks, they will face economic ruin in the future.

With the loss of poppy cultivation, and the international aid that bolstered the rural economy during the Afghan Republic, disposable incomes are falling and farmers are having to sell more of their stocks to make ends meet. Overproduction and dwindling demand for high-value horticulture, particularly with the closure of the Pakistani border and the loss of Afghanistan’s primary export market, is resulting in lower agricultural prices and incomes (see Figure 7). This is also having knock-on effects on trade and the service sector. In the absence of poppy, summer crops make up two-thirds of total agricultural income, leading to increased groundwater extraction and a falling water table, even in surface-irrigated areas. Landed farmers in Helmand are aware of how precarious their economic situation in Afghanistan has become, and fearful for the future, so they are sending family members to Iran and Pakistan to grow poppy there, as well as lobbying for the return to opium production in Afghanistan.

Figure 7: Only some of the largest landowners in southwest Afghanistan can meet their families' basic needs with current cropping patterns; and most landed farmers are experiencing year on year reductions in net income due to lower agricultural prices, forcing them to sell more of their opium stocks

Continuing drought has also imposed a collective shock on many rural communities in Afghanistan, especially those in the northeastern province of Badakhshan. The impact of drought on farmers in Badakhshan is exacerbated by the prevalence of small, irrigated landholdings, and the relocation of poppy to more remote rainfed lands with lower and more variable yields, following the imposition of the Taliban drugs ban. In these areas there is higher levels of planting this season in a bid to offset the income losses experienced in 2025, when drought, low crop yields (including opium), falling opium prices, and the loss of remittances from Iran imposed a significant financial burden on rural households (see Figure 8). Moreover, drier conditions during this winter planting season have not deterred farmers from planting more poppy on rainfed land. With few viable economic alternatives and mounting debts, most farmers have cultivated poppy regardless of the weather conditions and the risk of crop destruction in the future, conscious that they have no other viable economic options.

Figure 8: Even with continued poppy and marijuana cultivation most landed farmers in Badakhshan are unable to meet their basic needs due to small, irrigated landholdings and low yields in their rainfed land. As in the southwest agricultural incomes continue to fall due to low agricultural prices and lower yields caused by the drought

Large-scale outmigration from Afghanistan reflects this growing economic crisis and continues despite reports to the contrary. While many of Afghanistan’s official borders with Pakistan remain closed, there are multiple gaps in the fence on the border with Balochistan province in Pakistan that both people smugglers and migrants can exploit (see Figure 9 and 10). These are primary conduits for those wishing to travel to Pakistan, Iran and onto Turkey and Europe and have major entrepot en route. The complex hybrid nature of some of these entrepots means that access is governed by multiple armed groups, including armed state and non-state actors who extract rent on the movement of both goods and people (see Figure 11). The importance of these cross border routes will increase as growing numbers of farmers from southwest Afghanistan travel to Balochistan and Sistan Balochistan to find work in poppy cultivation, and security deteriorates in the tri-border area.

Figure 9: There are multiple places on the southwest border with Balochistan where the border fence can be crossed by car due to sand dunes and damage

Figure 10: Despite reports to the contrary, large numbers of irregular migrants continue to depart Afghanistan passing through Pakistan en route to Iran, and on to Turkey and Europe

Figure 11: Even though most official crossings are closed significant volumes of goods continue to be traded across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border

An Unravelling of Security in the Region

Inventory remains critical to the consent of landed farmers to the enforcement of the poppy ban in southwest Afghanistan, but as opium stocks run out it will become increasingly difficult for the Taliban to maintain order. While opium prices remain high, those with both land and opium stocks can manage the loss in annual agricultural income from abandoning opium production. Some of these farmers, particularly those in the former desert lands where farm sizes are large and poppy was concentrated during the Afghan Republic, retain significant inventory and continue to welcome the poppy ban.

However, those with smaller landholdings and therefore more limited opium stocks are increasingly being marginalised by the drugs ban, and are compelled to sell more of their opium stocks each year to meet their household expenditures. It is these smaller landed farmers, as well as landless sharecroppers who are most vociferous in their criticism of the Taliban, are pressing to return to poppy cultivation in the southwest, and increasingly relocating to Pakistan and Iran to grow poppy (see Figure 12). The longer the ban continues, the larger this pool of disgruntled farmers in the southwest will become, and the more difficult it will be for the Taliban to maintain support amongst their core constituents. It will be local commanders, especially those in northern Helmand, where many of the Taliban core fighters originate, who will be pressured by rural communities to ignore the drugs ban and allow a return to widespread poppy cultivation.

Figure 12: In contrast to landowners in southwest Afghanistan, many of whom have gained from the poppy ban due to opium stocks, those that sharecrop land have been left destitute by the poppy ban and should be the primary targets for assistance

Continued widespread poppy cultivation in Badakhshan also reflects both the growing economic crisis there and the limits of Taliban rule in northeastern Afghanistan. The Taliban has made repeated efforts to eliminate the crop in Badakhshan since the ban was announced in 2022, including mounting annual eradication campaigns that have resulted in widespread unrest and violence. While the authorities have succeeded in coercing farmers to relocate much of their opium production to the remote rainfed areas, farmers in Badakhshan appear to have planted even greater amounts of poppy in both rainfed and irrigated lands in 2026 (see Figure 13). Given the increasingly precarious economic situation farmers in the province find themselves in following the failure of last year’s crop and the wider economic crisis, there is a growing risk that farmers will resist any effort to destroy their crop, as they believe they have little to lose. As such, there is a high risk of violence in Badakhshan should the Taliban conduct a more robust eradication effort in the spring and summer of 2026.

Figure 13: Poppy cultivation expanded in rainfed land in Badakhshan in 2025 and looks set to increase again in 2026

It is notable that increased poppy cultivation in Iran and Pakistan has provided an important economic safety valve for Afghan farmers, and action to deter it and deport Afghan migrants could worsen the economic crisis, increasing the risk of rural unrest in Afghanistan. The rise of poppy cultivation in both Pakistan and Iran is a direct result of the Taliban’s poppy ban, rising opium prices, and limited state presence in border provinces such as Balochistan in Pakistan and Sistan Balochistan in Iran.

Similarly, action against the poppy crop in Iran and Pakistan will have knock-on effects for Afghanistan’s economy and governance. For example, if there were ten thousand hectares of opium poppy in Balochistan it would not only require as many as five thousand Afghan farmers as tenants, but up to one hundred thousand labourers during the harvest season alone, who would earn the equivalent of US$16.2 million in daily wages.

Shutting off this economic safety valve could result in significant economic and political repercussions in Afghanistan, especially given the likelihood of further increases in poppy cultivation in both Iran and Pakistan this year, and the growing importance remittances from these poppy farms are playing in the livelihoods of rural communities from southwest Afghanistan. The role that Afghan farmers are playing in the rise of poppy cultivation in these border areas also has the potential to further increase tensions between both Tehran and Islamabad and Kabul, as each looks to blame the other for rising drug production and the increased activities of insurgent groups.

Furthermore, since late 2025, there has also been growing evidence of increased insecurity on the Iran-Pakistan border, and with it a more supportive environment for the smuggling of fuel and people, as well as the production and trade in illicit drugs, including opiates and methamphetamine (see Figure 14 and 15). The outbreak of fighting that began in October 2025 between armed groups such as Jundullah and Amniat reflects the growing unrest in the tri-border area. The scale of poppy planting in late 2025 - including on drip irrigated lands in Sistan Balochistan – reflects a rural population that believed it had little to fear from the central authorities in Tehran and Islamabad. People smugglers and migrants also saw improved access to Iran in early 2026 due to increased corruption amongst the Iranian Border Guard, who looked to bolster their incomes in response to the collapse of the rial and diminishing oversight from Tehran.

Figure 14: While some argue reports of poppy cultivation in Balochistan are only “anecdotal”, high resolution imagery shows large fields - some exceeding five hectares - concentrated in multiple districts within the province

Figure 15: Similarly, there are areas of Balochistan where ephedrine production has become concentrated, and where large labs drawing on locally sourced ephedra are visible from high resolution imagery

While events are dynamic and uncertain, the current US and Israel military campaign against Iran could have several significant consequences. A weakened central government in Iran is likely to result in further fragmentation, as different criminal and armed groups look to exploit the multiple value chains that transit the tri-border area and better position themselves for what comes next (see Figures 16, 17 and 18). We should expect a temporary lull in activity while these groups initially recalibrate and look to avoid making costly mistakes on cross border trade during a period of heightened uncertainty. However, once a new “equilibrium” is reached there is the potential for some of these groups to move against key nodal points in these value chains and make both economic and territorial gains. Going forward, it will be important to monitor the key cross border value chains and the armed actors that exploit them, to better understand the risk of increased drug supplies and movement of people, as well as the changing security situation on the Iran-Pakistan border, particularly in Balochistan.

The Absence of Reporting is Not the Same as the Absence of Threat

Ultimately, if governments are to better understand the rapidly evolving situation in what used to be known as “the Golden Crescent” there is a need to look beyond the headlines and official drug related data. While data collection across much of the region is challenging, particularly for the United Nations who is often restricted in what it can report by host governments, the absence of official reporting – and some robust denials by the authorities – is not the same as the absence of drugs production and a rapidly growing criminal economy.

In the case of drugs, the scale of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan over the last three decades led many to focus their attention solely on what was happening there, and consider whatever production that persisted in Iran and Pakistan as marginal. Subsequently, the dramatic reductions in poppy cultivation in 2023 that followed the Taliban drugs ban led officials and commentators to believe that opium would “run out”, many predicting that this would be within an eighteen to twenty four month period. Opinion and economic assumptions also argued that plant-based drugs were a thing of the past, convincing many donors to focus their attention and resources on synthetics drugs.

Yet this is not what has happened. Not only have substantial inventories, and improved heroin processing in Afghanistan, ensured a continued flow of opiates but farmers, traders and producers in the region have adapted and innovated in response to the Taliban drugs ban. In Afghanistan, farmers persist with cultivation in areas where they can, and where they cannot they have moved to Iran and Pakistan, taking advantage of the deteriorating security situation in the border areas, preexisting market and familial linkages, and exploited new technologies such as drip irrigation. Similar geographic and technological advancements are also taking place in ephedra-based methamphetamine production in the region.

Consequently, contrary to expectations, these plant-based drugs economies are proving resilient, and production is adapting, relocating and embedding in areas that are nearer to consumer markets in the region and in Europe, and where there is currently less resistance from the authorities, and multiple armed groups prevail. A failure to recognise these developments will leave many governments ignorant of the growing threat, not only of the re-emergence of drugs production in the Golden Crescent and the implications this has for consumer markets downstream, but the risk this burgeoning criminal economy poses to a region already destabilised by war.

Figure 16: Key entrepot for the movement of migrants, people and drugs in the tri-border area have grown markedly over the last decade, shaped by changes to border infrastructure and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan

Figure 17: Smuggled fuel from Iran remains a critical element in the livelihoods of communities on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border, and a source of rent for the various armed actors operating in the area

David Mansfield has been conducting research on illicit economies in Afghanistan and on its borders each year since 1997. David has a PhD in development studies and is the author of “A State Built on Sand: How opium undermined Afghanistan.” He has produced more than eighty research-based products on rural livelihoods and cross-border economies, many for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, and working in close partnership with Alcis. David was also the lead researcher on the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s Counter Narcotics: Lessons from the US Experience in Afghanistan, covering the period from 2002- 2017.